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INTRODUCTION
Michael Jacobs
The following three Articles in this issue of the DePaul Law Review
all deal with issues arising from the refusal by a dominant firm to li-
cense all or some of its intellectual property (IP) to a smaller rival that
claims to need access to that property in order to provide effective
competition in a relevant market. Each Article discusses those issues
from a North American perspective; the first two focus on the United
States, while the third describes the Canadian approach. But to place
these Articles in a broader context, one must realize that the North
American perspective on these issues is not the only one, and that
European law takes a very different view of these matters.
In particular, one must acknowledge that antitrust law as applied in
North America grants a great deal more leeway to the dominant firm
than does its European counterpart. For reasons both historical and
cultural, courts in North America are much less suspicious of domi-
nance and much more willing to accommodate and encourage it than
are courts in Europe, a predilection made explicit in the recent Trinko
case.' At the same time, U.S. law tightly embraces the proposition
that, with the possibility of a rare exception discussed below, the in-
centives to produce intellectual property must not be encumbered or
diluted by any sharing obligations that antitrust law might otherwise
impose. This twin bias, if you will, is clearly visible with respect to
cases involving refusals by the dominant firm to license IP, in which
the issue of interest has been narrowed over the years so dramatically
that it has practically ceased to matter.
Thus, it has been solid and unchallenged law in the United States
since the SCM Corp. v. Xerox Corp. (SCM/Xerox)2 case in 1981 that a
dominant firm that has never licensed its intellectual property to a
rival has absolutely no duty to do so, regardless of the short-term eco-
nomic consequences of its refusal. Consequently, for the past twenty-
five years the only questions in this area have involved dominant firms
that decided initially to license IP to their rivals and then decided later
to revoke that license or refuse to extend it. Here, too, the case law
1. Verizon Commc'ns v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, L.L.P., 540 U.S. 398 (2004).
2. SCM Corp. v. Xerox Corp., 645 F.2d 1195 (2d Cir. 1981).
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has been extremely accommodating to the dominant firm. Thus, on
the broader reading of the applicable case law, the dominant firm's
refusal to continue licensing its IP is shielded from antitrust liability as
long as the reasons for its refusal are not "pretextual"; on the nar-
rower reading, the dominant firm's refusal is irrebuttably presumed to
be lawful. I suggest below that as a practical matter, the narrower
reading will eclipse the broader one, creating a de facto rule of legality
for all refusals to license by the dominant firm.
In Europe, however, the law is quite different. Courts and competi-
tion regulators are more suspicious of dominant firms, more attuned
to possibilities of short-term economic harm from certain of their ac-
tivities, and less disposed to exalt the incentives to create intellectual
property to a position of absolute, or near-absolute, preeminence. As
a consequence, despite some superficial similarities (Volvo 3 ), the Eu-
ropean case law in this area differs substantially from that of the
United States. In the famous Magill4 case, the Court of First Instance
(CFI) adjudged that certain television broadcasters (who were also
owners of the copyrights to their program listings and each of whom
prepared its own weekly single-channel program listings) had abused
their dominant positions (i.e., wrongfully monopolized) in the market
for those program listings by invoking their copyrights over the list-
ings to deny third parties the opportunity to publish complete weekly
guides to the programs of all the broadcasters.
On appeal, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) upheld the deci-
sion of the CFI, announcing that although a refusal to grant a license
in respect of an intellectual property right cannot "in itself"5 consti-
tute a general abuse of a dominant position, it might "in exceptional
circumstances"' 6 constitute abusive conduct within the meaning of Ar-
ticle 82 (the European equivalent to Section 2 of the Sherman Act).
In particular, the circumstances in Magill that warranted a determina-
tion of abuse were three: first, the defendants owned the IP rights to
the raw material indispensable to a comprehensive weekly guide, but
had chosen to use it so as to deprive consumers of a comparative basis
for choosing programs; second, no acceptable justification for that re-
fusal existed, which is to say that attempting to justify the refusal by
reference only to one's IP rights was legally inadequate; and third, the
defendants had effectively prevented the development of a new mar-
3. Case 238/87, Volvo (AB) v Erik Veng (UK) Ltd, 1988 E.C.R. 6211.
4. Radio Telefis Eireann (RTE) & Indep. Television Publ'ns, Ltd. (ITP) v. Comm'n (Magill)
1995 E.C.R. 1747.




ket, in publications containing complete weekly program listings, by
withholding access to their IP. In another recent case involving very
similar issues, IMS Health v. NDC, the Advocate General to the ECJ
found that different "exceptional circumstances" justified an order
compelling a dominant firm to license its copyrighted marketing for-
mat to a smaller rival, over the objection and against the wishes of the
dominant firm.7
These cases are remarkable in four respects at least. In the first
place, they demonstrate that European courts are willing, in certain
circumstances, to compel dominant firms to license their IP even to
rivals with which they have never before had a licensing agreement.
There is no SCM/Xerox immunity for steadfast refusals to deal. In the
second place, European courts are willing to do so in spite of the in-
centive effects that such a requirement might have on the production
of IP. In the third place, the administrative costs of determining a
proper price for the license and of resolving disputes about such pric-
ing and other relevant matters seem to matter little to the courts. And
in the fourth place, the obligation to license has been imposed in cases
where there had never before been a license grant, which suggests that
in those cases currently of interest in the United States-refusals to
license that follow an earlier grant-European courts would be much
more likely to impose liability on the dominant firm.
Of course, the cases in Europe caution that these requirements can
be imposed only under "exceptional circumstances"-when the owner
of the IP can provide no "objective justification ' 8 for its refusal and
where access to the IP is essential for "operating on a secondary mar-
ket"9 (that is, a separate and distinct market from the one in which the
IP owner is currently doing business). But the requirement exists nev-
ertheless, and because the criteria for its imposition are ambiguous at
best, it must necessarily serve as at least a small brake on innovative
efforts and a clear restriction on the freedom of the dominant firm.
U.S. law has no such requirements.
The three related articles in this issue focus, as mentioned above, on
U.S. and Canadian law. One offers a survey of U.S. law on refusals by
the dominant firm to license IP and a prediction about the effect of
the recent Trinko case on that area of law. One confines itself some-
what more narrowly to the analysis and comparison of two recent and
controversial opinions in this area by the Ninth and the Federal Cir-
7. Case C-418/01, IMS Health GmbH & Co. OHG v. NDC Health GmbH & Co. KG, 2004





cuit Courts of Appeal and offers a theory for choosing between them.
And the third surveys Canadian law in this area, which resembles U.S.
law in certain ways, but also contains as well some significant and in-
teresting differences. Each of the Articles offers an important
perspective.
In his Article, Refusals to License Intellectual Property After
Trinko,10 Professor Michael A. Carrier first discusses five approaches
adopted by United States federal courts in recent years to the problem
of a dominant firm's refusal to license its intellectual property to rivals
and then reconsiders the vitality of these approaches in light of the
United States Supreme Court's 2004 Trinko opinion. Professor Car-
rier persuasively argues that although not involving a refusal to license
IP by a dominant firm, Trinko's tone and content seem to mark out a
new path in the Supreme Court's general treatment of a dominant
firm's obligations to assist its rivals, a path that "will certainly not
make it any easier for plaintiffs challenging IP refusals to license.""1
The five pre-Trinko approaches to the IP licensing issue canvassed
by Professor Carrier are well-known to practitioners and academics
alike. The first, called "absolute immunity" by Professor Carrier, was
announced in 1981 in the case of SCM Corp. v. Xerox Corp.12 The
facts of the case were pleasantly simple: after the commercial pros-
pects for Xerox's plain paper copier became obvious to all, SCM
sought a license from Xerox to use its patents, a license that would
place SCM in direct competition with Xerox in the copier market,
leading Xerox-understandably enough-to refuse the licensing re-
quest. SCM claimed, accurately, that Xerox's refusal enabled it to
maintain its monopoly in the market for plain paper copiers, but the
Second Circuit rejected the claim because it concluded that in refusing
to share its technology with a would-be rival, Xerox did no more than
stand by patent rights lawfully acquired, insisting on the statutory
grant of exclusivity.
Though the Second Circuit had no need to make mention of it,
Xerox, unlike future defendants in similar cases in the United States,
had never licensed its IP to SCM or anyone else. Because of that criti-
cal fact, Xerox has come to stand for a seemingly unalterable rule of
U.S. law: a dominant firm that has never licensed its IP to rivals may
lawfully refuse any request for a license, regardless of the motive for
its refusal and regardless of the effect of its refusal on competition.
10. Michael Carrier, Refusals to License Intellectual Property After Trinko, 55 DEPAUL L.
REV. 1191 (2006).
11. Id. at 1209.
12. 645 F.2d 1195 (2d Cir. 1981).
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All of the other cases discussed by Professor Carrier involve qualita-
tively different behavior that has proven more problematic for courts
to resolve: dominant firm refusals to continue licensing their IP to ri-
vals with whom they had previously cooperated. Consequently, the
message of Xerox, slightly restating Professor Carrier's characteriza-
tion, might be: "absolute refusal, absolute immunity"; it is a message
that has remained unchanged and unchallenged in the United States
for the past twenty-five years.
The second, third, and fourth approaches analyzed by Professor
Carrier are variations on a theme. In each of the relevant cases, a
dominant firm that had formerly made its IP available to smaller ri-
vals, changed its policy, and refused to continue licensing the relevant
IP. In each case, the smaller rival then sued, alleging that the refusal
to deal was undertaken in pursuance of improper monopoly mainte-
nance, and thus in violation of § 2 of the Sherman Act. In the Xerox
case, CSU, L.L.C. v. Xerox Corp.,13 the Federal Circuit adopted what
Professor Carrier calls a rule of "near-absolute immunity" for such
refusals to deal. A dominant firm's refusal to continue licensing its IP
to smaller rivals, the Court held, is central to the patent system's right
to exclude and is thus per se lawful, save for three specific exceptions:
(1) licensing through an arrangement that ties patented and unpat-
ented products (arrangements that are now likely to be viewed more
kindly in light of the Supreme Court's ruling this term in Independent
Ink v. Illinois Tool Works1 4); (2) refusing to license a patent obtained
through a fraud on the Patent Office; and (3) using the patent in a
scheme of sham litigation. Under this approach, in the absence of one
of the exceptions, a dominant firm's refusal to continue licensing can-
not violate the antitrust laws, regardless of the effect of that refusal or
the motives behind it.
The Data General15 case provides a variation on Xerox, the "pre-
sumptive legality" approach in Professor Carrier's terms. Like Xerox
in the case just discussed, Data General had terminated a course of
cooperative conduct with its rivals, conduct that included licensing
some of its IP to those rivals. Data General's decision to stop licensing
provoked the usual challenge (an antitrust suit) for the usual reasons
(alleged § 2 violation). After examining the purposes of the IP laws
and focusing particularly on their presumed incentive effects, the
Court concluded that an IP owner's "desire to exclude others from use
13. 203 F.3d 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
14. 126 S. Ct. 1281 (2006).
15. Data General Corp. v. Grumman Sys. Support Corp., 36 F.3d 1147 (lst Cir. 1994).
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of its ... work is a presumptively valid business justification .. " ,,16
Perhaps because it did not need to do so, the Court failed to describe
or otherwise indicate the kind of evidence capable of rebutting that
presumption: it was enough for purposes of its decision that the plain-
tiff had not offered any such evidence.
In Kodak H, the Ninth Circuit attempted to fill in the blank left
incomplete by the Data General opinion. In factual circumstances
functionally identical to those of the other cases, Kodak had ceased
licensing its IP to smaller rivals with whom it had previously cooper-
ated. Without access to the protected products, the rivals alleged, they
were unable to compete effectively with Kodak, and several were
forced out of business. The Ninth Circuit, affirming a jury verdict for
plaintiffs, adopted the Data General presumption ("the desire to ex-
clude is a presumptively valid business justification"), but held that
the presumption of legality could be rebutted by proof that the partic-
ular justification offered by defendants was "pretextual.' 17
Under the facts of the Kodak case, the Court's holding mattered,
because at trial (before this rule of presumptive legality had been an-
nounced) Kodak had offered several far-fetched excuses for its behav-
ior that could have seemed "pretextual" to a reasonable jury. Aside
from its effect on the parties, however, the holding in Kodak is almost
certain to be irrelevant in the business world. From now on, any domi-
nant firm that ceases to share important IP with smaller rivals will be
effectively immune from liability (subject of course to the Xerox ex-
ceptions) as long as it simply says either "I stopped cooperating be-
cause I decided to exclude my rival from access to my IP," or "I
stopped cooperating because I decided that I could make more money
by doing so." Because these explanations are always plausible and
thus unassailable, even under the apparently stricter standards of Ko-
dak H, they are almost certain to be raised in all similar cases in the
future and to absolve the dominant firms raising them from liability.
The most significant practical effect of Kodak II therefore is to com-
plete the convergence of the three seemingly different tests (Xerox/
CSU; Data General; and Kodak II) described and discussed by Profes-
sor Carrier. Because dominant firms with powerful IP benefit under
each test from a powerful presumption of legality when they refuse to
continue licensing IP to their smaller rivals; and because a perfectly
simple and plausible justification is available to all dominant firms
whose refusals might be challenged (the wish to exclude one's rivals,
16. Id. at 1187.




or the wish to make more money), in the future dominant firms in the
position of Kodak are highly unlikely to fall afoul of the antitrust laws.
This leaves the fifth approach examined by Professor Carrier, the
essential facilities doctrine, whose pedigree in this area of the law
comes from a district court opinion overruled on appeal and predi-
cated on the three-part notion that IP might be both a "facility" and
"essential" within the meaning of that doctrine, that even if so there
are no countervailing reasons to deny rivals access to it, and that the
Supreme Court would endorse such an approach. To describe this ap-
proach is essentially to reject it. Moreover, Justice Scalia's statement
in Trinko that the Supreme Court has "never recognized [the essential
facilities] doctrine" 18 and that it could see "no need either to recog-
nize it or to repudiate it here" 19 is bound to cast very serious doubt on
the vitality of that doctrine.
As Professor Carrier observes, Trinko also seems fundamentally
and in several ways to dampen if not eliminate the prospects for the
adoption of a doctrine of judicially-enforced IP sharing. In the first
place, Trinko specifically places Aspen Skiing20-the linchpin of the
rule requiring a dominant firm to share its assets (albeit non-IP) with
its smaller rival-"at or near the outer boundary"21 of § 2 liability,
confining its applicability to its own particular and peculiar facts. In
the second place, Trinko expresses a clear preference for allowing
dominant firms wide latitude in their behavior towards their smaller
rivals and a clear distaste for saddling them with court-enforced shar-
ing obligations. According to the Court in Trinko, sharing require-
ments have little, if anything, to recommend them: they discourage
investment, require ongoing and costly judicial oversight, facilitate
collusion, and intrude unduly upon the freedom historically accorded
to dominant firms by the Supreme Court to make unfettered choices
about those firms with which they will deal.
For these reasons and more, Professor Carrier concludes, Trinko
suggests quite powerfully that, if faced squarely with the issue, the
Supreme Court would be highly unlikely to require dominant firms to
continue licensing their IP to smaller rivals. Moreover, he argues,
Trinko also suggests that, if the issue presented itself, the Court would
be apt to endorse one of the more absolute lower court approaches,
along the lines of either SCM or Xerox/CSU, and would reject those
18. Verizon Commc'ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, L.L.P., 540 U.S. 398, 411
(2004).
19. Id.
20. Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585 (1985).
21. Trinko, 540 U.S. at 409.
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that are more flexible in their requirements. Though Professor Carrier
says, after canvassing all these developments, that "the law on IP re-
fusals to license is ... unclear, ' 22 in fact it seems quite clear: dominant
firm refusals to license-both initially and following a period of licens-
ing-are virtually and practically immune from antitrust challenge.
Trinko might make this state of affairs more obvious than it would
otherwise have been, and might also provide an extended rationale for
why it should be so, but it hardly can be said to have created it.
Professor Joseph Bauer also focuses his attention on recent U.S.
case law in an effort to harmonize what he calls the "potentially con-
flicting principles" of intellectual property law and antitrust law, re-
spectively. 23 The conflict, in Professor Bauer's view, arises from the
grant of exclusivity given to the owner of intellectual property, on the
one hand, and the proposition that "under the antitrust laws, a unilat-
eral refusal to deal may constitute an element of a violation of § 2 of
the Sherman Act, '24 on the other. The "central question" thus ad-
dressed by Professor Bauer's article is "[u]nder what circumstances
should the antitrust laws impose a duty to deal on the owner of intel-
lectual property?" 25
Professor Bauer purports to answer this question by comparing and
contrasting the approach taken by the Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit in Image Technical Services v. Eastman Kodak26 (Kodak I)
with that taken by the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in In
re Independent Service Organizations Antitrust Litigation27 (Xerox!
CSU). After discussing these cases and other related opinions, as well
as "the policies underlying the antitrust and intellectual property re-
gimes," Professor Bauer then proposes "a harmonization '28 of those
"supposedly conflicting" 29 regimes. On his view, since patents and
copyrights confer limited grants of "defined rights," 30 attempts by the
owners of those rights to extend them "beyond [their] statutory
scope" 31 are unlawful. This principle, he claims, supports his conclu-
sion that the proper approach to refusals to license is the one adopted
by the Ninth Circuit in Image Technical (Kodak), an approach whose
22. Carrier, supra note 10, at 1209.
23. Joseph P. Bauer, Refusals to Deal With Competitors by Owners of Patents and Copyrights:
Reflections on the Image Technical and Xerox Decisons, 55 DEPAUL L. REV. 1211, 1212 (2006).
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. 125 F.3d 1195 (9th Cir. 1997)
27. 203 F.3d 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2000).






vitality he claims remains largely unaffected by the Supreme Court's
opinion in Trinko.
In several ways, Professor Bauer's ambitious thesis is problematic.
The supposed conflicts between the intellectual property and antitrust
laws-"conflicts" that seemed important to academics and antitrust
regulators in the 1960s and 70s-have over the past twenty years been
recognized by most courts and scholars to be complementary means
of achieving the same beneficial end, consumer welfare. Maximizing
consumer welfare, which for antitrust purposes is broadly defined as a
state of economic affairs characterized by low (quality adjusted)
prices, high output, and high levels of innovation, is widely acknowl-
edged to be the main goal of both antitrust law and intellectual prop-
erty law. Antitrust law seeks to accomplish this end largely with a
stick: preventing collusion by rivals, prohibiting mergers that threaten
to raise price, and punishing dominant firms that abuse their power.
By contrast, intellectual property law uses a carrot: successful innova-
tors receive large and long-lasting rewards, rewards that will en-
courage even more efforts at innovation and thus contribute
significantly to consumer welfare.
Questions arise periodically, of course, about whether the rewards
conferred by the intellectual property regime are properly calibrated.
Some claim that the reward structure is more generous than it need be
to encourage the "proper" level of innovation and that this excessive
generosity leads to rent-seeking and improperly diverts resources
from higher and better uses. And indeed, the specifics of the proper
term of patent and copyright protection have been the subject of
heated debate in recent years (see the Copyright Extension Act and
the related debate). But even the most heated of those debates accept
the general principle that consumers benefit from some level of in-
creased innovation, a proposition that is perfectly consistent with the
goals of antitrust law. "Harmonizing" these areas of law thus seems to
be largely unnecessary.
Secondly, there is a certain tautological quality to Professor Bauer's
main argument. Dominant firms, he contends, should be prohibited by
antitrust law from "seeking to exercise rights beyond the statutory
scope" 32 of their powerful copyrights or patents. This test originated
in early patent tying cases, where it was feared that by tying unpat-
ented products to patented ones, dominant patent holders might im-
properly extend their market power into second markets that would




of ways and continue to use it today, but the test has serious difficul-
ties. First and foremost, its meaning is unclear: the "lawful grant" of
exclusivity does not confer market power by its own terms; nor does it
mention economic markets. It covers inventions, in the case of pat-
ents, not the markets in which those inventions might be sold. Thus, it
might be the case that an invention's utility (and thus its market
power) would naturally extend to two or more economic markets.
Think of a small variation on the Kodak and Xerox cases: assume that
certain patented parts enable the manufacturer to produce a machine
that accounts for a dominant share of the original equipment market;
and then assume that the same patented parts (or copyrighted instruc-
tions), which are necessary to maintain and service that equipment,
have never been licensed for sale by another firm. The same patents,
on these not unusual facts, have given rise to power in two separate
markets. Has the "statutory scope" of the patents been exceeded? It
seems not. Should the inventor be prohibited from taking monopoly
rewards in two markets, simply because its patents were particularly
useful? Again, it would seem not.
The point is that "the statutory scope" of a patent or copyright
grant is described without reference to economic markets and there-
fore cannot serve as a useful limit on the behavior of the dominant
firm. It is possible, of course, to read antitrust limitations into those
grants, but that would be an act of imagination and declaration, not an
act of logic or of economic reasoning. Consequently, it seems un-
helpful to propose a test based on "the statutory scope" of the intel-
lectual property right in question: in theory, the "scope" is either
indeterminable or irrelevant to the inquiry of interest; in practice, "the
scope" in any particular case would be whatever the trial judge might
determine it to be, which in turn would necessarily be a determination
unmoored from definitional or economic reality.
In the second place, because Professor Bauer's test arose in the pat-
ent tying context, it fails to address-let alone answer-the most im-
portant question raised in the refusal to license cases. That is, if one
accepts-as Professor Bauer seems to-the legitimacy of the holding
in Xerox/SCM that a firm that has never licensed its IP to rivals need
not ever do so, then on what basis is one to distinguish between that
scenario and those in the CSU and Kodak H cases, where an initial
license grant was withdrawn? In particular, Xerox/SCM would seem-
ingly permit the dominant firm to use its IP to dominate as many mar-
kets as the IP could legitimately control. But under Professor Bauer's
test, the dominant firm's decision to grant an IP license to its smaller
rival might result in its having much less leeway in this regard. But
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why? The use of the IP in both instances is identical, save for the li-
cense grant and refusal in the second example. It is the revocation of
the license that distinguishes the cases, nothing more. Thus, unless the
revocation might somehow undermine contractual reliance interests-
a possibility that seems highly implausible-the smaller rival could
have no basis for complaint; and would have no basis whatever for an
antitrust claim.
D. Jeffrey Brown and Patrizia Martino, lawyers with the Canadian
firm of Stikeman Elliott, provide a Canadian perspective on the issues
and problems of IP licensing by the dominant firm.33 They write that
for the most part the Canadian approach to these issues has been simi-
lar to that of the United States, with Canadian law and antitrust en-
forcers viewing the unilateral refusal to license IP as "beyond the
scope of the provisions of the Canadian Competition Act. '34 They
note, however, that there are differences between the two regimes, in
particular the provisions within the Canadian Competition Act and
Patent Act for "special remedies" to address certain specified abuses
of IP rights.
After first discussing U.S. law on refusals to deal by the dominant
firm, Aspen and Trinko in particular, Brown and Martino provide a
brief overview of the Canadian Competition Act, Canada's federal an-
titrust law. Section 75 of the Competition Act covers "refusals to
deal," which are "civilly reviewable" under the Act: remedies for vio-
lations are limited to injunctive relief and administrative monetary
penalties. Section 75 sets forth six explicit conditions necessary to
make out a violation. First, the refusal must substantially affect a per-
son in his or her business or preclude him or her from carrying on that
business. Second, the adverse effect must arise from his or her inabil-
ity to obtain adequate supplies of the relevant product on usual trade
terms. Third, that inability must stem from insufficient competition
among suppliers of the product. Fourth, the person adversely affected
must be willing to meet the supplier's usual trade terms. Fifth, the
product must be in ample supply. And sixth, the refusal to deal must
have, or be likely to have, an adverse effect on competition in a mar-
ket, a criterion added to the law in June 2002. Brown and Martino
then review three cases brought under § 75, which stand collectively
for the proposition that § 75 does not apply to refusals by the domi-
nant firm to license its IP.
33. D. Jeffrey Brown & Patrizia Martino, Intellectual Property Licensing by the Dominant




Section 79 of the Competition Act proscribes the abuse of a domi-
nant position and is thus analogous to § 2 of the Sherman Act. Brown
and Martino observe that because Canadian case law has recognized
the proposition that a "refusal to deal" might violate § 79, in theory
that section might provide a basis for regulating a dominant firm's
refusal to license its IP. They note, however, that subsection 79(5) sig-
nificantly limits the applicability of § 79 to those kinds of refusals, ex-
empting from the law's coverage conduct undertaken "pursuant only
to" the exercise of any right or interest derived from specified IP stat-
utes. Moreover, Brown and Martino note, as interpreted by the Com-
petition Tribunal in Tele-Direct,35 the exemption applies regardless of
the IP owner's motivation for refusing a license.
Brown and Martino next describe and analyze § 32 of the Competi-
tion Act and § 65 of the Patent Act, which provide special remedies
for "abuse" of IP rights. Each statute provides that if a court is satis-
fied that the conduct in question prevents or lessens competition un-
duly, then it may grant an order directing, among other things,
compulsory licensing. Although these statutes would seem to permit a
relatively high degree of judicial intervention into decisions to refuse
to license IP, Brown and Martino report that § 32 is "essentially mori-
bund, '36 that "there is no jurisprudence considering its application, '37
and that section is "rarely used. ' 38 They observe as well that the best
guidance as to the meaning and effect of these laws comes from the
Intellectual Property Enforcement Guidelines released in 2000 by the
Competition Bureau, Canada's antitrust regulator. The Guidelines in
turn reaffirm the general proposition that unilateral refusals to license
IP-whatever their motivation-cannot be challenged under the gen-
eral provisions of the Competition Act (§ 75 and § 79) and are suscep-
tible to challenge only rarely under § 32. Nevertheless, Brown and
Martino caution that both sections remain good law, providing a basis
for remedies for refusals to license, serving to distinguish Canadian
law from its U.S. counterpart, and requiring the attention and consid-
eration of Canadian practitioners and businesses.
In conclusion, Brown and Martino view the U.S. approach as one in
which "the balance appears to have shifted strongly in favor of IP
laws" 39 through what they regard as the rule of per se legality adopted
35. Canada (Dir. Investigation & Res.) v. Tele-Direct (Pub'ns) Inc., [1997] 73 C.P.R.3d. 1, 32
(Comp. Trib.), available at 1997 C.P.R. LEXIS 1114.
36. Brown & Martino, supra note 33, at 1258.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 1247.
39. Id. at 1270.
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in Xerox. They regard Canada's statutory approach as more multi-fac-
eted than U.S. law. And they see in § 32 of the Competition Act and
§ 65 of the Patent Act a source of potentially useful stopgap measures
against anticompetitive refusals to license that is lacking in the U.S.
system.
Taken together, the Articles in this issue provide us with a compre-
hensive view of the U.S. and Canadian law in this interesting and
problematic area. They offer different approaches, different perspec-
tives, plausible predictions and new proposals. We are fortunate to be
able to publish them and thank the authors for their time, thought,
and energy.
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